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Democracies are declining worldwide. Lawmaking and judicial review 
can help to stabilize democracies and protect fundamental rights. But these 
safeguards can also be misused to facilitate democratic backsliding and 
empower “legalistic autocrats” who deploy law to circumvent constitutional 
restraints on their power. This Article compiles empirical data from more 
than 140 countries to provide a framework for understanding how autocrats 
repurpose national security law to consolidate power in weak democracies. 
The Article demonstrates that policymakers worldwide enact amorphous 
national security statutes. Meanwhile, courts cite deference to executive 
authority and political questions as they abdicate their responsibilities for 
judicial review of national security laws. Legalistic autocrats exploit this 
statutory vagueness and judicial deference to undertake actions counter to 
democratic principles. The convergence of autocratic politics, statutory 
vagueness, and judicial deference fosters the emergence of a dangerous 
liaison that can be described as dark law. In the shadow of consolidated state 
enforcement powers, dark law allows autocratic leaders—operating under 
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the guise of defending national security—to circumvent limitations on their 
authority and selectively investigate, detain, prosecute, and imprison 
disfavored groups.   
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Democracies are declining worldwide.1 Leaders in flagging democratic 
states openly disparage norms and institutions that once shielded democratic 
populations from autocratic rule.2 Legal scholars have described democracy’s 
 
1  See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018) 
(noting the rise in new forms of authoritarianism and the subversion of democratic norms); 
DAVID RUNCIMAN, HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS (2018) (arguing the current crisis in democracy 
is unlike those of the past and democracies may fail in different ways); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018) (discussing potential threats 
of authoritarianism in the U.S.); CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber, 
Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) (documenting global forces and national 
politics weakening constitutional democracies worldwide). 
2  SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 2 (2019) 
(summarizing theories of constitutional dysfunction and democratic loss under the Trump 
Administration). 




waning as “recession,” 3  “breakdown,” 4  “retreat,” 5  “backsliding,” 6 
“deconsolidation,” 7  “retrogression,” 8  “constitutional dismemberment,” 9  and 
even “constitutional rot.” 10  Constitutional law and judicial review have the 
potential to steady liberal republics and guard fundamental rights.11 But in times 
of social uncertainty and political instability, political leaders can also weaponize 
law to strike at constitutional protections. 
Kim Lane Scheppele has previously shown how passing new laws 
enables autocratic power in weak democracies.12 State leaders, often elected 
by voting publics, deploy law to dismantle liberal constitutions and 
consolidate political authority.13 Such “legalistic autocrats” effectively use 
national security and emergency laws to erode constraints on their power and 
roll back democratic accountability.14  
This Article builds on Scheppele’s insight that some autocrats 
consolidate their enforcement powers under the cover of law.15 It uses original 
 
3  Larry Diamond, Democracy in Decline: How Washington Can Reverse the Tide, 95 
FOREIGN AFF. 151, 159 (2016). 
4 Michael Pal, Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the Law of Canadian Democracy, 
57 MCGILL L. J. 299, 302 (2011). 
5 JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 
AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 10 (2013). 
6 Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 5 (2016). 
7 Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 
9–10 (2017). 
8 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 
78, 96 (2018).  
9 Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 
(2018). 
10 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
AMERICA 19, 19–20 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018).  
11  Samuel Issacharoff, Judicial Review in Troubled Times: Stabilizing Democracy in a 
Second-Best World, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2019) (“Judicial review is one of many 
mechanisms that remove from direct and immediate democratic accountability institutions 
that may be predictability compromised in the press of political expediency.”). 
12 Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2018) [hereinafter 
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism]; Kim Lane Scheppele, The Legal Complex and Lawyers-in-
Chief, in THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE: STUDIES INSPIRED BY THE WORK 
OF MALCOLM FEELEY 361, 363–64 (Rosann Greenspan, Hadar Aviram & Jonathan Simon eds., 
2019) (“[S]ometimes authoritarian leaders trained in law do exactly what one would guess with 
law’s powerful potential. Such leaders can turn the neutral potential of legal ideas into illiberal 
law, sometimes even pulling judges and other legal officials along with them.”). 
13 Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 12, at 547 (“[D]emocracies are not just failing 
for cultural or economic or political reasons. Some constitutional democracies are being 
deliberately hijacked by a set of legally clever autocrats, who use constitutionalism and 
democracy to destroy both.”). 
14 Id. at 571. 
15  Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocracy Under Cover of the Transnational Legal Order, in 
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data and analyzes the content of national security laws worldwide. The Article 
also describes for the first time how political leaders worldwide rely on statutory 
vagueness in national security legislation and judicial deference in national 
courts to circumvent constitutional constraints on leaders’ political power. 
Previous legal scholars have argued persuasively that national 
security laws broaden the scope of executive power, curtail civil liberties, and 
ease paths to criminal prosecution for those suspected of national security 
offenses.16 Yet for all the scholarly attention devoted to the costs of national 
security, legal scholarship tends to downplay the global dimensions of 
contemporary national security lawmaking.17 Scholars have been disposed to 
focus on threats of democratic collapse in particular countries rather than on 
more incremental erosions of democratic liberalism worldwide.18 Constitutional 
construction and national security policymaking often are analyzed in 
isolation from transnational institutions and ideas.   
This Article, in contrast, describes global shifts in national security 
lawmaking. The research widens the aperture of previous case studies and 
comparative investigations of national security law and contributes to an 
emerging field of transnational legal studies by developing a relational approach 
to national security.19 Building on theories in relational sociology, the Article 
develops a new relationalist framework for studying national security 
lawmaking as a process embedded in legislative-judicial-political relations.20  
 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 188, 190 (Gregory Shaffer, 
Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday eds., 2019). 
16 See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND 
LIBERTY 4 (2008) (“[T]errorism, one type of security threat, forces choices to be made that 
may restrict civil liberties.”); Terence Taylor, United Kingdom, in COMBATING TERRORISM: 
STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES 221 (Yonah Alexander ed., 2002) (describing an EU 
counterterrorism measure that “[e]nabl[ed] law enforcement agencies to target and track 
terrorists by requiring carriers to supply information about passengers and freight.”). See 
generally COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE (Jenny Hocking & 
Colleen Lewis eds., 2008) (describing national and international counter-terrorism measures 
in the wake of the United States’ war on terror and their potential impacts on democracy). 
17 For an exception to national and comparative legal approaches, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The 
International Standardization of National Security Law, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 437, 437 
(2010) (“But if nationally specific national security law seemed the norm before 9/11, 
developments since seriously challenge that view, at least when it comes to fighting terrorism.”). 
18 Bermeo, supra note 6, at 14.  
19 For examples of transnational legal studies, see generally Kathryn Sikkink, THE JUSTICE 
CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011); 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); 
Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 447 
(2006); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal 
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach 
to International Law, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 189 (2015).  
20 For an overview of relational sociology, see THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF RELATIONAL 
SOCIOLOGY (François Dépelteau ed., 2018). 




The Article further advances the concept of dark law as an analytic 
for understanding how processes of statutory construction, judicial review, 
and politics converge in ways that undermine democratic norms and 
institutions in weak democratic states. Based on content coding of national 
security laws in 140 countries, the Article documents widespread statutory 
vagueness in national security legislation. Lawmakers routinely draft 
legislation with opaque language that is used to suspend ordinary substantive 
and procedural standards. 21  This allows political leaders to circumvent 
deeply rooted constitutional protections. Legalistic autocrats seek to evade 
constitutional obstacles and consolidate their authority through novel 
interpretations of amorphous statutory language. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it advances a processual and 
relationalist approach to national security and develops the concept of dark 
law. 22  Second, the Article discusses democracy’s decline and the global 
transformation of national security. Third, the Article documents three 
converging trends in global national security lawmaking: 1) the enactment of 
vague legal provisions at the behest of state leaders; 2) the abdication of 
judicial review in national security cases; and 3) the enforcement of ill-
defined national security laws by legalistic autocrats. The Article concludes 
with a warning about the potential abuse of national security laws in weak 
democratic states. 
 
I. RELATIONALISM AND DARK LAW 
 
As democracy wanes in many countries, legalistic autocrats have 
relied on vague legal provisions and weak judicial review to circumvent 
constitutional limits on their authority. Existing critiques of national security 
laws in weak democracies have rightfully drawn attention to the curtailment 
of civil liberties and the expansion of policing powers.23 However, global 
 
21 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 2–
3 (2006); see also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The ‘War on Terror’ and Extremism: Assessing the 
Relevance of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, 92 INT’L AFF. 275, 281 (2016) (“The 
new measures have enabled democratic states to make use of emergency powers by invoking 
human rights regimes, and to do so with less justification or excuse than would previously 
have been deemed necessary.”). 
22 Dark law does not reference actual darkness or lightness but rather processes by which 
vague statutes and weak judicial review undermine legal transparency and democracy. Dark 
law describes historically contingent webs of legislative-judicial-political relations that 
obscure unconstitutional or undemocratic state action. 
23 See generally COURTS AND TERRORISM: NINE NATIONS BALANCE RIGHTS AND SECURITY 
(Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack Jr. eds., 2011) (examining contemporary judicial 
responses to national security laws in nine countries); COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES 
OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 16 (providing an assessment of ten national counterterrorism 
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changes in relations between lawmaking, judicial review, and politics have 
received less scrutiny. By triangulating data on statutory vagueness, judicial 
deference, and autocratic rule, this Article advances a relationalist framework 
for understanding the global transformation of national security lawmaking. 
This relational approach to national security develops a conception of dark 
law—not as a particular kind of law, but as a set of legislative-judicial-
political relations that erode constitutional protections and empower 
legalistic autocrats. 
Legal scholars tend to think about law as either substance or 
procedure. It follows that most legal analyses focus on discrete principles or 
procedural standards. However, this Article rejects the study of law extricated 
from relational processes and contexts.24 Building on insights from relational 
sociology, the Article envisions the study of law as an empirical investigation 
of relational interactions between agents and institutions that generate useful 
insights about social worlds. Such relationalism resists reification of social 
objects—such as national security law or democracy—and raises awareness 
about the inescapable interdependency of social agents—including 
lawmakers, judges, and politicians.25  
As an intellectual movement relational sociology has gained influence 
in recent decades and developed several distinct approaches to social analysis. 
These include a pragmatist approach inspired by John Dewey and American 
Pragmatism, a structuralist approach influenced by George Simmel, and a 
power-conflict approach that builds on the work of Norbert Elias and Pierre 
Bourdieu. 26  This Article draws primarily on Dewey’s pragmatic 
transactionalism and Bourdieu’s reflexivity and methodological relationalism.   
Four ontological pillars undergird a relational approach to legal 
analysis. These ontologies are dynamic and subject to change, but orient 
relationalist scholarship and reveal tendencies in relational thinking. First, 
 
strategies post-9/11); COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 
16 (describing national and international counter-terrorism measures in the wake of the 
United States war on terror and their potential impacts on democracy). 
24 For more background on relational sociology, see generally THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK 
OF RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20; Mustafa Emirbayer, Manifesto for a Relational 
Sociology, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 281 (1997) [hereinafter Emirbayer, Manifesto]; Ann Mische, 
Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS 80 (John Scott & Peter J. Carrington eds., 2011); Mustafa Emirbayer, Relational 
Sociology as Fighting Words, in CONCEPTUALIZING RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY: 
ONTOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 209 (Christopher Powell & François Dépelteau 
eds., 2013). 
25 François Dépelteau, Relational Sociology, Pragmatism, Transactions, and Social Fields, 
25 INT’L REV. SOCIO. 45, 52–53 (2015). 
26 See François Dépelteau, Relational Thinking in Sociology: Relevance, Concurrence and 
Dissonance, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20, at 
25–26 (discussing “three major sub-currents within [relational sociology]”: pragmatism, 
structuralism, and “[t]he study of power relations, inequalities and conflicts”). 




law exists only through social interactions. Law is not an independent thing, 
substance, or social fact. Legal reasoning, legal decision-making, and legal 
writing are profoundly interdependent upon social interactions in particular 
legal fields.27 Lawyers, statutes, and judges do not and cannot exist outside 
of particular sets of relations.28 And because there is no law beyond social 
relations, the study of law requires relational inquiry and empirical 
investigation of social interactions.   
Second, law is not a reflection of objective principles and doctrine. A 
relational approach rejects modernist dualisms, including dualisms of 
knowledge and practice, reason and action, and objectivity and subjectivity. 
Relational legal analysis has the capacity to undermine dualistic distinctions 
and to study interactions between various processes and legal participants as 
a means to understand their mutual constitution. Relationalism recognizes 
that legal relations, and the social prejudice embedded within them, cannot 
be divorced from reasoning minds. The construction of law cannot be 
disentangled from everyday social relations and the habitualized actions of 
legal agents in specific legal fields. Law unfolds through the transactions of 
legal players as they navigate specific environments. Law is not something 
fixed beyond individuals; it is something people do together, participate in, 
and reproduce through their social actions. 
Third, law is historically contingent. Statutory construction, for 
example, depends on dynamic policymaking processes that emerge from 
historical relations, which are themselves social processes. Legal definitions 
and procedures—from definitions of deviance to standards of due process—
are produced in particular social contexts that condition intersubjective 
understandings of law. To engage in legal analysis, therefore, is also to 
engage in historicity. Relational legal scholars must historicize legal agents 
and institutions.   
Finally, a relational approach to law also demands a degree of 
reflexivity about objects of investigation.29 The very meaning and significance 
of law derives from its reference to a set of juridical relations in specified 
contexts. 30  Therefore, the content of law should not be presumed or 
 
27 Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction, in Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: 
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 806–07 (1987). 
28 Law and legal identities are realized only through social practice. A lawyer becomes a 
lawyer through interactions with clients and other legal agents. A judge becomes a judge 
through adjudicative action in relations with other legal participants. 
29 PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 
100 (1992). 
30  Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 816 (1987).  
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preconstructed. 31  Legal scholars must interrogate their own assumptions 
about subjects of investigation and relations that constitute social objects, and 
also grapple with the ways that their identities and social locations impact 
their analytic categories.32  
The need for reflexivity, however, should not be interpreted as an 
unequivocal embrace of contextualism that belies efforts to develop more 
general frameworks or theories to understand lawmaking. A relational 
approach recognizes that law is continuously made and remade, moment by 
moment, relation by relation. 33  Law is in a constant state of becoming. 
However, law’s ongoing transformation and adaptation to new situations 
produces novel logics of practice and social patterns that can be classified 
and theorized in an effort to address future social problems. The global 
transformation of national security lawmaking, for example, creates novel 
opportunities for political mobilization and presents opportunities for state 
leaders to exercise law differently. State officials have curtailed civil liberties, 
authorized administrative detention, and rolled back due process protections 
in criminal prosecutions.34 These new logics in national security lawmaking 
also produce gaps in the law that sanction previously forbidden state action.35 
Relational approaches to legal analysis help to reveal the social consequences 
of lawmaking by moving away from textualism and towards the study of 
social processes, transactions, and institutions. At times, this requires the 
development of new relational concepts, such as dark law.  
 
A. Dark Law  
 
Dark law describes a paradoxical process in which autocratic leaders 
rely on vague statutory language and judicial passivity to engage in state 
action counter to the rule of law. It is a relational term that describes processes 
by which national security policymaking, judicial review, and autocratic 
politics converge. The study of dark law, therefore, requires methodological 
relationalism—legal analysis centered on relations and transactions rather 
than on substantive legal standards or procedural rules. 
 
31  See PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 106 (2000) (“[Social sciences can] 
undertake to understand and explain their own genesis and, more generally, the genesis of 
scholastic fields, in other words the processes of emergence (or autonomization) from which they 
arose, as well as the genesis of the dispositions that were invented as the fields were constituted 
and which slowly install themselves in bodies in the course of the learning process.”).  
32 BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 160. 
33 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 869, 879–80 (1988). 
34 DONOHUE, supra note 16, at 4.  
35 See, e.g., Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
1, 2 (2004) (“Even in modern times terrible injustices have been perpetrated in the name of 
security on thousands who had no effective recourse to law. Too often courts of law have 
denied the writ of the rule of law with only the most perfunctory examination.”) 




Dark law is not a type of law in the traditional sense. It is not a subset of 
national security law or criminal law. In fact, it is not a kind of law at all but 
rather a set of relations and processes that constitute lawmaking in weak 
democracies. Conceptually, dark law describes particular configurations of 
legislative-judicial-political relations that empower autocrats to clandestinely 
transform legal language into political power. It is a pernicious outgrowth of 
vague statutory construction, deferential judicial review, and political 
opportunism. Authorities brandish national security law as a response to 
constructed security threats in order to circumvent legal restraints on their power. 
National security law consists of relationships and interactions in 
courts and political contexts. Legislatures enact security statutes, judges 
interpret them, and police and prosecutors enforce them at particular 
moments and in particular jurisdictions. Relations between legal agents 
determine the meanings and consequences of national security lawmaking 
and enforcement. While legal scholars will acknowledge that substantive law 
is not simply anterior to procedure, legal analyses still trend towards 
substantialism—the idea that rigid legal content underlies experiences of law. 
Methodological relationalism and the concept of dark law challenge this 
substantialism and urge more empirically grounded relational analysis. 
The primary aim of developing dark law to understand national 
security is to move beyond conceptions of national security legislation as a 
substantive kind of law and towards a recognition of national security 
lawmaking as an unfolding series of historicized relationships and 
intersections with processes of judicial review and political action. 36 The 
concept of dark law illuminates new logics of lawmaking, judicial 
interpretation, and politics that pool state power to undermine democracy.37 
National security lawmaking is conceived as processes, interactions, and 
relationships rather than substantive statutes and rules. National security law 
inevitably operates through overlapping legislative, judicial, and political 
fields, which are empirically interrelated and mutually determinative, but also 
change over time. Relationalist legal scholars, therefore, should endeavor to 
identify various kinds of relationships in lawmaking that produce new 
opportunities for problem-solving. Vague statutory construction, judicial 
deference, and autocratic rule produce a particular pathology that aids 
legalistic autocrats in the consolidation of political power. The recognition of 
these processes aids in developing defenses against autocratic legalism and 
countering undemocratic effects.   
 
36 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1990) (providing a critique of 
scholastic reason divorced from practical logics and a model for scientific practice). 
37 For more on pooling powers, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
211, 213 (2015) (“Pooling blends the legal authorities that different agencies derive from 
distinct statutory schemes. And it enables the executive to combine one agency’s expertise 
with legal authority allocated to another.”). 
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Dark law as an analytic category has three defining features. First, 
dark law is a series of relationships and exists as an extension of other social 
processes, including statutory construction, judicial interpretation, and 
autocratic politics. National security scholars who study jurisprudence and 
formal statutory law gain valuable insights into curtailment of substantive 
rights and procedural protections. However, this approach to legal analysis 
risks myopia to logics, practices, and processes that fundamentally determine 
law’s effects in particular countries and communities. Formal law functions 
very differently in different places and at different times, and the study of law 
in isolation from social and institutional relations can discount disparities in 
legal effects. By adopting a relational approach to legal analysis, legal 
scholars can better understand practical impacts of national security 
lawmaking on democracy and constitutional rights. 38  Such relationalism 
endeavors to sidestep what John Dewey called “fixations”—ends and values 
extracted from social relations.39  
Second, dark law should be understood as a complex of legislative-
juridical-political relations which exists in social fields that are bounded both 
temporally and geographically. The concept of fields is a useful way to locate 
relations between people and institutions. 40  Fields are social spaces of 
objective relations that constitute a social environment and condition actors’ 
practices and struggles. 41  Fields emerge from historical processes and 
gradually gain autonomy from other systems of relations.42 As the internal 
apparatus of a field develops, it cultivates an autonomous bounded space 
capable of socializing participants into a set of rules and constraints and 
reproducing a specific symbolic system.43 The field therefore may be thought 
of as both a positional structure that reproduces social hierarchies and a 
symbolic structure that defines a particular logic of practice against 
competing logics of practice in society. Fields may exhibit similar 
characteristics, or homologies, to other fields even as they remain bounded 
spaces.44 However, fields still remain semi-autonomous sites of social and 
 
38 The focus on process and relations is a common feature of Bourdieusian and relational 
sociology. See generally Emirbayer, Manifesto, supra note 24 (exploring the features of a 
dynamic and continuous social reality). 
39 John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE 
COMMON MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN DEWEY TO CELEBRATE HIS EIGHTIETH 
BIRTHDAY 220, 227 (1940) (“All ends and values that are cut off from the ongoing process 
become arrests, fixations. They strive to fixate what has been gained instead of using it to 
open the road and point the way to new and better experiences.”). 
40 Daniel N. Kluttz & Neil Fligstein, Varieties of Sociological Field Theory, in HANDBOOK 
OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 185, 186 (Seth Abrutyn ed., 2016). 
41 BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 97. 
42 John Levi Martin, What is Field Theory?, 109 AM. J. SOCIO. 1, 26–28. 
43 NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 3–4 (2012). 
44  BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 100. 




political struggle that insulate and inculcate, animate and discipline, motivate 
and constrain. The concept of fields orients empirical researchers to historical 
forces and institutional dynamics and draws attention to the particular 
resources—social, cultural, and material—used by actors in those 
environments to achieve their goals. 
Finally, methods for understanding dark law as a set of relations in 
specific fields should be grounded in empiricism and, whenever possible, rely 
on evidence triangulated from various sources. The reorientation of legal 
analysis to relationships in specific social fields calls for more data and 
investigation. Relational approaches to the study of law move beyond 
ordinary language to gather information from those people and institutions 
most affected by legal rules and enforcement. Dark law provides a 
relationalist framework for the study of national security lawmaking in weak 
democracies, which should prove useful to researchers seeking to historicize 
dynamic relationships between statutory construction, judicial review, and 
legalistic autocrats.  
 
II. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE AND THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
After the Cold War, a broad coalition of liberal states promoted open 
economies and greater multilateral cooperation. Lawmakers revised 
constitutions and democratic institutions proliferated.45 Many legal reforms 
promoted democratic principles, such as fair elections and basic human 
rights. 46  With this global diffusion of democratic norms and the 
corresponding growth of democratic institution, democracy’s progressive 
triumph appeared secure. Every year between 1975 and 2007, the number of 
democracies worldwide either held steady or multiplied.47  
However, this floodtide of democratic reform began to ebb in the last 
decade.48 Mounting evidence now shows democracy in retreat.49 Every year 
 
45 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic 
Institutions, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 261-302 (Beth A. 
Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008); Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons & 
Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 450 (2007). 
46  Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner, Introduction, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF 
DEMOCRACY xxi–xxiv (Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner eds., 1996)  
47 Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 141, 141 (2015). 
48 KURLANTZICK, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
49 See YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER 
AND HOW TO SAVE IT 2–3 (2018) (discussing the rise of populism and decline of democracy 
in countries like the United States, Russia, Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, and predicting that 
“[m]ore countries may soon follow”); DAVID RUNCIMAN, HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS 7–9 
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since 2007, more countries have experienced decreases in freedom. 50 
Democracy even appears under threat in former stalwarts of the liberal order. 
From Brexit in the United Kingdom to the rise of populism in Europe to 
growing white nationalism in the United States, norms and institutions in 
bedrock democracies have come under fire in recent years. Political scientists 
and legal scholars are still somewhat divided on whether democratization has 
stalled in recent years or whether these changes indicate a historic decline.51 
But there is an emerging consensus on the crises of public confidence in 
democratic governance.52 Data shows, for example, that millennials in many 
well-established constitutional democracies now express weaker approval for 
democratic values.53 Recent trends also suggest a major shift in people’s 
faithfulness to democratic norms. 54  On a global scale, failed democratic 
experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan, uneven transitions after the Arab Spring 
in many Middle Eastern countries, and military coups and electoral fraud 
have dampened democratic enthusiasm in transitional states.55 A growing 
number of hybrid democratic regimes also seem to be backsliding, including 
Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines. 56  Meanwhile, 
shifting global politics have emboldened leaders in non-democracies, 
including China and Russia.  
 
(2018) (imagining a gradual decline of democracy by exploring potential risks of coup, 
catastrophe, or technological takeover). 
50 Larry Diamond, Democracy Demotion: How the Freedom Agenda Fell Apart, 98 FOREIGN 
AFF. 17, 17 (2019). 
51 See generally Anna Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, A Third Wave of Autocratization Is 
Here: What Is New About It?, 26 DEMOCRATIZATION 1095 (2019) (providing a summary of 
autocratization events through the twentieth century to show a decline in democracy); ROGER 
EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY (2018) (tracing the cause of the rise of anti-politics movements to distrust of 
government, destruction of communal identity, increasing economic inequality, and changes 
in the relationship between identity and political brands).  
52 MOUNK, supra note 49, at 3.   
53 See, e.g., Foa & Mounk, supra note 7, at 5 (“American citizens are not just dissatisfied 
with the performance of particular governments; they are increasingly critical of liberal 
democracy itself. Among young Americans polled in 2011, for example, a record high of 24 
percent stated that democracy is a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ way of running the country—a sharp 
increase both from prior polls and compared to older respondents.”) 
54 Larry Diamond, Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump, 31 J. DEMOCRACY 36, 37–38 (2020). 
55  See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 47, at 144 (“Since 2000, I count 25 breakdowns of 
democracy in the world—not only through blatant military or executive coups, but also 
through subtle and incremental degradations of democratic rights and procedures that finally 
push a democratic system over the threshold into competitive authoritarianism.”). 
56  Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 241 (2018) (“Across a range of different 
geopolitical contexts, an increasing number of countries can appropriately be characterized 
as ‘hybrid’ democracies, such as competitive authoritarian regimes and 
‘democratorship[s].’”). 




Contemporaneous with democracy’s decline, disenchanted publics 
are voting for autocratic leaders as alternatives to traditional political party 
leaders.57 Although such leaders may struggle to consolidate political control, 
their ascent signals a dangerous illiberal trend, particularly in countries where 
new leaders deploy law to subvert democratic institutions.58 The Law and 
Justice government in Poland, for example, has challenged the legitimacy and 
autonomy of the country’s constitutional court and also used Polish law to 
target civil society organizations and opposition groups.59 According to a 
2019 Freedom House Report:  
Of the 23 countries that suffered a negative status change over 
the past 13 years (moving from Free to Partly Free, or Partly 
Free to Not Free), almost two-thirds (61 percent) had earned 
a positive status change after 1988. For example, Hungary, 
which became Free in 1990, fell back to Partly Free this year 
after five consecutive years of decline and 13 years without 
improvement.60  
While reasons for such declines are manifold, democratic publics worldwide 
appear more open to autocratic forms of leadership, and evidence suggests a 
willingness on the part of autocrats to exploit law and judicial deference to 
achieve both personal and political ends. 
The global transformation of national security began decades before 
9/11 or the rise of legalistic autocrats.61 In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, 
numerous countries enacted counterterrorism measures with vague statutory 
 
57 See generally Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, The Freedom House Survey for 2016: 
The Dual Threat of Populists and Autocrats, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 105 (2017) (describing an 
increase in the popularity of populist and nationalist politics); Sergei Guriev & Daniel 
Treisman, Informational Autocrats, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 100 (2019) (assessing the impact of 
a twenty-first century trend away from brutal dictatorship and toward nonideological 
autocrats who are elected but consequently dismantle democratic institutions). 
58 See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, The Perpetual Crises of Democracy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 5 
(2007) (describing an increasing trend of authoritarian rulers using democratic institutions 
like free elections to legitimize their control). 
59  Kriszta Kovács & Kim Lane Scheppele, The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: 
Lessons from Hungary and Poland—and the European Union, 51 COMMUNIST & POST-
COMMUNIST STUD. 189, 194–98 (2018). 
60  Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat [https://perma.cc/ 
MT9K-8ZYM] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021); see also Sarah Repucci, The Freedom House 
Survey for 2019: The Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, 31 J. DEMOCRACY 137, 137 (2020) 
(stating that “Freedom House found that 2019 was the fourteenth consecutive year of decline 
in global freedom,” caused in part by leaders’ willingness to disregard institutional 
safeguards and the rights of minority groups). 
61 See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” 
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1361 (2018) (describing how legal divides in 
approaches to terrorism emerged from a range of legal authorities and predated 9/11). 
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definitions. 62  However, 9/11 accelerated changes in national security 
policymaking worldwide. Lawmakers increasingly drafted expansive 
legislation aimed at nebulous security threats. The war on terror gave national 
policymakers permission to target a broad range of events and actions—from 
intensifying border security to expanding domestic surveillance to increasing 
regulation of global financial networks.  
Democracy’s decline breathed new life into many of the national 
security laws enacted in the shadow of 9/11.63 In the decade after the 9/11 
attacks, most countries in the world passed new laws to address potential 
threats of terrorism.64 Even small island nations with no history of terrorism 
enacted expansive new counterterrorism legislation.65 Consequences of the 
transformation have been far-reaching, particularly for weak or hybrid 
democratic states. New laws were decoupled from considerations of violence 
in some countries. They became less rooted in security realities and more 
dependent on party officials and political rhetoric. Revised national 
emergency acts and counterterrorism laws, for example, empowered 
executives to unilaterally declare national crises and unlocked an array of 
powers.66 Under new legislation, leaders could freeze financial assets of those 
suspected of criminal violations, mobilize military and national guards, 
restrict travel, and institute forms of martial law.67  
 
62 See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (2006) (surveying the evolution of 
foreign and domestic terrorism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries). 
63 WILHELM MIROW, STRATEGIC CULTURE, SECURITISATION AND THE USE OF FORCE: POST-
9/11 SECURITY PRACTICES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 3–4 (2016). 
64 See Scheppele, supra note 17, at 442 (“Member states overwhelmingly applauded these 
efforts – and rapid changes in domestic anti-terror laws followed around the world. While 
international law famously has compliance problems, such problems seemed to disappear 
here. All 192 U.N. member states filed at least one report with the Security Council's 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), a subsidiary body that was created to monitor and 
enforce compliance with Resolution 1373.”). 
65 See generally Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Chair of the U.N. Security Council Counter-
Terrorism Committee), Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1624 (2005) by Member States, U.N. Doc S/2016/50, annex (Jan. 18, 2016) (providing a 
survey of counterterrorism measures enacted by UN Member States).  
66 Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency 
Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3373 (2013) (“Many state emergency 
statutes do not expressly provide whether the initial, agency emergency determination is 
judicially reviewable.”). 
67 J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE 
L.J. 1020, 1024 (2020) (“[T]he concept of national security has transformed from its 
relatively stable Cold War meaning anchored in the context of interstate conflict. Today, 
national security has evolved to address a range of threats, including nonstate actors and 
nonmilitary and nonhuman threats, such as economic crises, cybersecurity, infectious 
disease, climate change, transnational crime, and corruption, which are often unmoored from 
interstate rivalries. These developments give rise to the ‘new’ national security: a growing 
 




Changes to counterterrorism legislation provide a salient example of 
this global transformation of national security. Within three weeks of the 9/11 
attacks, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1373, 
which required all UN member states to adopt new national measures to 
combat terrorism. 68  The resolution promoted domestic criminalization of 
terrorist offenses, mandated counterterrorism reporting, and developed strict 
regulation of fundraising activities for suspected terrorism-related 
organizations.69 Within two months, United States President George W. Bush 
signed the expansive USA PATRIOT Act into law, which authorized an array 
of state surveillance and border security measures.70 Less than a decade later, 
more than 142 countries worldwide had enacted or revised their 
counterterrorism laws.71  
Global counterterrorism legislation had national effects too. Laws 
expanded state authority to detain and prosecute a range of people suspected 
of terrorism-related offenses by minimizing judicial oversight of 
investigations and restricting suspects access to legal counsel. 72  In most 
countries, for example, new legislation heightened screening procedures for 
those entering the country, expanded domestic surveillance, increased the 
ability of state officials to track and freeze financial assets, and narrowed the 
scope of judicial review in terrorism prosecutions. 73  Some countries, 
including the United States, also created special military courts or sanctioned 
the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists. 74  Even the COVID-19  
 
 
collection of security practices agnostic to the source or nature of a threat, unbounded by 
time and space, and decentered from any overriding great-power or interstate conflict.”).  
68 S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
69 Id.  
70 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 34, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).  
71  Data compiled by the author in partnership with the Program on Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism at Human Rights Watch.   
72 In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide Since September 11, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (June 29, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/29/name-security/counter 
terrorism-laws-worldwide-september-11 [https://perma.cc/FCX6-W3EX]. 
73 See generally COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 16 
(providing an assessment of ten national counterterrorism strategies post-9/11); COUNTER-
TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 16 (describing national and 
international counter-terrorism measures in the wake of the United States war on terror and 
their potential impacts on democracy); GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (Victor 
V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005) (providing a summary of domestic and 
international responses to terrorism in the twenty-first century). 
74  See generally GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Oren Gross eds., 
2013) (describing the creation of military courts as a mechanism to prosecute people 
suspected of terrorism-related offenses). 
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pandemic has brought increased attention to the need for robust national 
security and emergencies laws.75 
The global transformation of national security has not been restricted 
to a specific kind of political regime. Both democracies and authoritarian 
states rewrote penal codes, enacted more stringent immigration statutes, and 
passed financial regulations that provided authorities greater capacity to 
monitor and halt financial transactions. 76  Even countries with minimal 
histories of political violence embraced wide ranging procedural and 
substantive legal reforms. 
However, new national security laws did not universally restrict civil 
liberties. Some nations—including Canada, Switzerland, and Scandinavian 
countries—were able to pass laws without curtailing liberties.77 The impact 
of counterterrorism laws and restrictions on domestic legal rights varied by 
the type of political regime.78 In states with moderate levels of repression, for 
example, new laws had harmful effects on civil liberties.79 But these effects 
diminished in less repressive countries.80 This evidence suggests democratic 
institutions may help to protect residents from violations of substantive and 
due process rights even where national lawmakers introduce expansive 
national security reforms. Law’s impact depends on political and juridical 
relations in specific countries. 
National security lawmaking also appears to have decoupled from 
political violence in many countries. According to Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), incidents of terrorism that resulted in fifteen or more casualties peaked 
in the 1980s. 81  Fewer terrorist attacks occurred in the early 2000s. 82 
 
75 See, e.g., Benjamin Della Rocca, Samantha Fry, Masha Simonova & Jacques Singer-
Emery, State Emergency Authorities to Address COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 3:03 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-address-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/ 
7XAQ-YJU7] (summarizing emergency orders that states may use in response to COVID 
emergency). 
76 See generally GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 73 (summarizing 
the legal solutions employed by nations seeking to increase counterterrorism measures); 
NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE COUNTERTERRORISM 
(Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2007) (identifying best practices for enacting legal 
counterterrorism measures while also protecting human rights). 
77 Mariaelisa Epifanio, Legislative Response to International Terrorism, 48 J. PEACE RSCH. 
399, 403 (2011). 
78  Eran Shor, Leonardo Baccini, Chi-Ting Tsai, Tai-Ho Lin & Titus C. Chen, 
Counterterrorist Legislation and Respect for Civil Liberties: An Inevitable Collision?, 41 
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 339, 352 (2018). 
79 Id. 
80 Id.   
81 Global Terrorism Database: Information on More than 200,000 Terrorist Attacks, START, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ [https://perma.cc/ EQF6-DQSM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).  
82 Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism, 38 
CRIME AND JUST. 413, 458 (2009). 




In fact, incidents of terrorism declined globally between 1992 and 2004.83 
While terrorism incidents fluctuate per year, global trends in terrorism 
violence do not correlate with patterns of legal reform between 1970–2011.84 
Although public concerns about national security increased after 9/11, 
empirical data suggests that most legislative reforms happened independent 
of incidents of political violence.85 Neither the number of terrorist events nor 
the number of civilians killed significantly correlates with the enactment of 
new counterterrorism laws, with one exception: there was a higher likelihood 
that a law would be passed immediately following an attack that killed more 
than ten civilians.86 Therefore, while counterterrorism lawmakers appear to 
take advantage of policy windows after deadly attacks, most legislative action 
on national security is not responsive to levels of political violence. Cross-
national data on counterterrorism laws from years 1981 and 2009 also show 
no direct relationship between new laws and a reduction of terrorist 
violence.87 Global national security lawmaking has become more responsive 
to politics than to violence.88 This global transformation of national security 
lawmaking has created novel opportunities for legalistic autocrats to 
consolidate their power. 
 
III. TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAWMAKING WORLDWIDE 
 
Three trends have accompanied global decoupling of national 
security lawmaking from political violence. First, national security laws have 
incorporated vague statutory language. Second, courts have abdicated their 
responsibility for judicial review of new national security legislation, often 
citing political questions or deference to executive power in the realm of 
national security. And third, legalistic autocrats have used new national 
 
83 Eran Shor, The Spatial Diffusion of Counterterrorist Legislation, 1970-2011, 64 SOC. 
PROBS. 106, 106–07 (2016). 
84 Id. at 123. 
85 Id. at 118. 
86 Id. (“The log of each event with at least ten casualties increases the odds of legislation by 
about 4 percent. The effect further increases following attacks in which more than 100 
civilians had died, with the odds for legislation growing by about 10 percent.”) 
87 Eran Shor, Counterterrorist Legislation and Subsequent Terrorism: Does it Work?, 95 
SOC. FORCES 525, 529 (2016) (“[C]ounterterrorist legislation may often be no more than an 
empty declaration, designed to send the message that the state is indeed doing something to 
fight terrorist threats.”) 
88 See Elena Pokalova, Legislative Responses to Terrorism: What Drives States to Adopt New 
Counterterrorism Legislation?, 27 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 474, 475 (2015) (“[B]efore 
September 11 the decision to adopt new counterterrorism legislation correlated with the 
number of terrorist organizations operating in the territory of a state. . . . After September 11, 
however, . . . the only significant predictors of the decision to adopt new counterterrorism 
legislation turned out to be the presence of previous counterterrorism legislation and the 
participation of a state in the War on Terror.”) 
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security laws to consolidate their power and circumvent constitutional 




Vagueness surfaces when lawmakers fail to describe legal concepts 
with precise statutory language.89 It is perhaps the most pernicious form of 
linguistic indeterminacy.90 While some vagueness is inevitable in statutory 
construction, excessively vague statutes invite faulty interpretations and abuse. 
For these reasons, judges are typically empowered to narrowly interpret and 
clarify legal language that does not provide the public with adequate notice of 
its provisions, or, under void-for-vagueness doctrine, strike down statutes that 
improperly delegate interpretive authority to law enforcement.91  
Judges often rely on the ordinary meanings of language in legislation 
and escape vagueness problems. 92  Courts routinely refuse to consider 
evidence beyond what judges believe to be the text’s plain or ordinary 
meaning. 93  Nevertheless, problems associated with vagueness can occur, 
even with well-drafted legislation.94 
Courts generally oppose vagueness on two grounds. First, vague 
statutes provide insufficient notice to publics about the kinds of conduct 
regulated under the law.95 If language in national security legislation is overly 
vague, citizens may not be able to decipher which acts are illegal and could 
accidently commit national security offenses.96 Additionally, if publics do 
not understand which actions are illegal, they may avoid all actions that could 
 
89 Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 509, 516 (1994) (“[P]roblems of vagueness will arise whenever we confront a 
continuum with terminology that has, or aspires to have, a bivalent logic.”). 
90 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 32–33 (2012) (explaining that vagueness is often intentional). 
91 Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 294–95 (2020).  
92 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (using ordinary 
meaning to discern legislative purpose behind a preemption statute). 
93 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2412 (2018) (“Given the clarity of the text, 
we need not consider such extra-textual evidence.”). 
94 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1138–39 
(2017) (noting that while individual pieces of legislation may be well-drafted and clear, their 
overlap allows prosecutors to “choose from a large ‘menu’ of criminal charges” and exert 
undue discretion). 
95 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (“[T]he court found that the language 
failed to provide adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law 
enforcement officials, and set juries and courts at large.”). 
96 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Ordinary 
connotation does not always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation of a 
law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to show that it is correct.”). 




be construed as illegal under the vague statute. 97  This also has negative 
effects on the public because it may stifle legal conduct or generate 
trepidation among lawful citizens. 
Vagueness concerns related to notice can be resolved with recourse 
to the statutory rule of lenity, which allows judges to resolve vagueness 
problems in favor of defendants. 98  However, in the context of national 
security offenses, courts may place less reliance on the rule of lenity or other 
defendant-friendly procedural protections.99 
 The second reason that courts generally oppose vagueness is a lack of 
clear standards for enforcement. Vague statutory language gives wide 
discretion to law enforcement to investigate and detain individuals who they 
suspect of national security offenses. This discretion risks arbitrary or 
discriminatory conduct by police, prosecutors, or juries who may interpret 
legal provisions based on personal suspicions or bias. Further, vagueness can 
also blur lines of authority and raise questions about the proper standards for 
judicial review.100 
There is no single approach to statutory vagueness.101 But, in contrast 
to statutory ambiguity, which involves divergent meanings generally 
distinguishable in context, vagueness provides extensive latitude to legalistic 
autocrats who seek to employ laws for unintended ends. Therefore, judicial 
deference to vagueness can present serious problems for checks on legalistic 
autocrats in weak democracies, where courts can be exceptionally deferential 
to executive authorities.   
Statutory vagueness is common in national security legislation. 
Lawmakers worldwide enacted a range of laws as part of the war against 
 
97 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015) (“Our cases establish that the 
Government violates [due process] by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under 
a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it 
punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[T]he canon of strict 
construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving 
ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.”); State v. Pena, 
683 P.2d 744, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 683 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1984) (“[W]here the 
statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”). 
99 See WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
FEDERAL TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 1 (2015) (noting “a disturbing incursion on the 
procedural and substantive rights” generally afforded criminal defendants, “often in the name 
of national security”). 
100 See Goldsmith, supra note 91, at 284–86 (discussing rationales underpinning the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, including threats to separation of powers and standards of judicial review). 
101 Lawrence M. Solan, Why It Is So Difficult to Resolve Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, 
in VAGUENESS AND LAW 231, 234 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (“[T]here really is 
no single approach to vagueness that transcends the situation, so even the most committed 
formalist will be forced to shift from one approach to another.”). 
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terrorism that expanded law enforcement powers and eased paths to 
prosecution for people suspected of national security offenses. In some cases, 
lawmakers likely intended to enact vague statutory language. But vagueness 
was also a byproduct of legislative hastiness and public pressure to over-
criminalize activities connected with terrorism.   
National security vagueness problems also reveal inconsistencies in 
how lawmakers define national security. For example, even after a century of 
multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, there is no international 
definition of terrorism.102 For years, UN officials labored without success to 
build consensus on what constitutes terrorism. 103  Informed by sixteen 
international legal instruments on terrorism, working definitions 
continuously circulated through UN committees and other international 
bodies, but produced no general definition. This failure to reach agreement 
partly reflects opportunities for strategic indeterminacy in national security 
laws. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for example, Resolution 1373 
mandates cooperation among all member states in combating terrorism, but 
provides no binding definition of terrorism. 104  States can decipher for 
themselves what acts of political violence rise to the level of terrorism, and 
political leaders can use variation in definitions across national security laws 
to bypass constitutional constraints on their authority.105   
Content coding of national counterterrorism laws worldwide shows 
frequent vagueness problems in terrorism definitions. 106  Lawmakers in 
eighty-eight countries, for example, define terrorism as acts that threaten 
“public order,” but these lawmakers rarely provide guidelines for interpreting 
the meaning of public order or enumerate specific threats to public order. As 
 
102 See Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept 
in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B. C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the great concern about terrorism, it is 
most often said that no universally (or even widely) accepted definition of terrorism exists at 
international law.”). 
103 Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss, Whither Terrorism and the United Nations?, in 
TERRORISM AND THE UN: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 3, 4 (Jane Boulden & 
Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2004). 
104 S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
105 For an exploration of the undefined nature of the term “terrorism,” see generally Donald 
Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOCIO. THEORY 14 (2004); Charles Tilly, Terror, 
Terrorism, Terrorists, 22 SOCIO. THEORY 5 (2004); LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING 
TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED “TERRORISM” (2013). 
106 In order to assess the substantive content of the counterterrorism laws, the author coded 
legislative texts of the archived counterterrorism laws with a focus on seven categories. 
Countries were the primary unit of analysis for the content coding. The seven categories 
included: 1) Definitions of terrorism; 2) Definitions of terrorist organizations; 3) Prohibitions 
on material support for terrorism; 4) Limitations on speech that incites, legitimates, or lends 
support to terrorism; 5) Expanded police powers; 6) Procedures for administrative detention; 
and 7) The imposition of heightened penalties for terrorism-related offenses. 




a result, officials have read counterterrorism laws to prohibit a range of 
activities—from blocking traffic during public demonstrations to posting 
information about political protests on social media. Similarly, 
counterterrorism laws in at least forty states ban acts that cause “public 
disruptions,” but again few laws define with any specificity those acts which 
meet the legal threshold for a public disruption. Legislative provisions in at 
least thirty-six countries exclude any requirement that acts of terrorism cause 
terror or fear, which jettisons the conceptual distinction between terrorism 
and other forms of violence.107 Such ill-defined definitions of terrorism lend 
themselves to expansive interpretations by state authorities.108 Ten countries 
have even enacted counterterrorism laws that lack any definition of terrorism. 
 
Table 1: Differences in Legal Definitions of Terrorism After 9/11, (N=142)109 
 
 Number of  
Countries 
 Number of  
Countries 
Define terrorism 132 No terrorism definition 10 
Include harm             
to property 
79 Do not include harm to 
property 
63 
Include harm              
to public order 










39 No references to      
ideological motivations 
103 
Reference fear  
or terror 
108 Does not reference fear 
or terror 
36 
Exempts national    
liberation movements  




Exempts dissent or 
political advocacy 
15 Does not exempt      




107 See Jeff Goodwin, What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism?, 3 SOC. MOVEMENT 
STUD. 259, 259 (2004) (reviewing JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY 
RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL (2003)) (“Terrorism . . . is but one type of political violence.”). 
108 See, e.g., Noah Bialostozky, The Misuse of Terrorism Prosecution in Chile: The Need for 
Discrete Consideration of Minority and Indigenous Group Treatment in Rule of Law 
Analyses, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 81, 81 (2007) (“Despite significant progress in its 
transition to democracy, the prosecution of Mapuche under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(‘Terrorism Act’), for acts not internationally considered to be terrorism, has caused 
significant erosion of rule of law principles in Chile.”). 
109 Counts based on coded cross-sectional data on counterterrorism laws worldwide in 2009.   
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Hong Kong’s new security law offers a recent example of statutory 
vagueness in national security legislation.110 The law, which was enacted 
before it was made public, criminalizes a broad range of ill-defined conduct, 
including breaking away from the country (secession), undermining the 
power or authority of the central government (subversion), using violence or 
intimidation against people (terrorism), and colluding with foreign or external 
forces.111 Under the law, communist party officials in Beijing have authority to 
interpret the scope of the law and oversee a special national security commission 
to monitor its enforcement. Trials may be heard behind closed doors and people 
suspected of violating provisions of the law can be wiretapped and surveilled. 
Even damage to public transit may be deemed an act of terrorism and punished 
by life in prison under the legislation. Defendants can be forced to stand trial and 
be sentenced in mainland Chinese courts. The legislation also authorizes 
prosecution of nonresidents of Hong Kong, including foreigners who support 
democracy and independence for Hong Kong.   
Hong Kong police have arrested dozens of people under the new 
national security law, including pro-democracy media magnate Jimmy Lai.112 
“In one swoop, the authorities rounded up not only some of the most aggressive 
critics of the Hong Kong government but also little-known figures who had 
campaigned on far less political issues,” reported journalists at the New York 
Times.113 The new law has effectively silenced pro-democracy advocates and 
barred pro-democracy candidates from seeking elected office.114 
Hong Kong’s national security law evidences the danger posed by 
indefinite statutory language. Vagueness in national security law provides 
legalistic autocrats opportunities to sidestep limits on their authority. Absent 
 
110 Javier C. Hernández, Harsh Penalties, Vaguely Defined Crimes: Hong Kong’s Security 
Law Explained, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/ 
asia/hong-kong-security-law-explain.html [https://perma.cc/TH2C-SF6P]. 
111 English Translation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National 
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, XINHUANET (July 1, 2020, 12:50 
AM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139178753.htm [https://perma.cc/AC 
W9-4TKL]. 
112 Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, Hong Kong Arrests Jimmy Lai, Media Mogul, Under 
National Security Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/ 
world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-lai-national-security-law.html [https://perma.cc/6JR2-HGYX]. 
113 Vivian Wang, Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, With Mass Arrests, Beijing Exerts an 
Increasingly Heavy Hand in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2021/01/06/world/asia/china-hong-kong-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/K7M7-6SMV]. 
114See Austin Ramzy, Elaine Yu & Tiffany May, Hong Kong Is Keeping Pro-Democracy 
Candidates Out of Its Election, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
07/29/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-security-law.html [https://perma.cc/FK25-WBLM] (“[T]he 
city’s authorities have taken aggressive steps against the pro-democracy opposition. Officials 
on Thursday barred 12 candidates, including well-known pro-democracy figures, from the 
September legislative election.”). 




meaningful judicial review, vague definitions of national security offenses 
grant leaders virtually unbridled power to selectively investigate, detain, 
prosecute, and imprison disfavored groups.   
 
B. Judicial Deference 
  
Judicial review is an important safeguard of democratic principles and 
institutions for several reasons.115 First, judges invalidate legislation that on 
its face violates constitutional, international, or customary law. 116  Such 
constitutional review imposes constraints on policymakers based on existing 
doctrine and legal standards and also delineates the outer boundaries of 
legitimate policymaking activity. Legal decisions establish a record of 
judicial reasoning and legal precedent that acts as a counterweight to 
overzealous lawmaking. 
Second, judges strike down, clarify, or revise vague statutory 
constructions that fail to articulate with specificity the kinds of conduct to be 
regulated, prohibited, or punished by legislators. Lawmakers often hastily 
enact laws during crises that endure long after emergencies end. 117  By 
reviewing national security statutes, courts can temper or eliminate 
unconstitutional effects and maintain rule of law. 
Finally, judicial review gives recourse to minority interests that may 
otherwise be trampled by the tyranny of the majority. Judicial review can aid 
in the defense of marginalized group rights and may induce politics of 
compromise and nonviolence. Judicial institutions often are more insulated 
from political pressures due to pre-established periods for judicial 
appointment or life tenure and, therefore, are in a stronger position to make 
unpopular challenges to state power.118 
 
115 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1762 n.31, 1767 n.67 (2015) (detailing the 
independent judiciary’s power of judicial review of other government branches). 
116 Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: 
The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 182 (2020). 
117 David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times 
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2566 (2003) (“Considered over time, judicial review of 
emergency and national-security measures can and has established important constraints on 
the exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is acceptable in future 
emergencies.”); Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 116, at 182 (“[T]he suspension principle is 
inextricably linked with the idea that a crisis is of finite—and brief—duration. To that end, 
the principle is ill-suited for long-term and open-ended emergencies like the one in which 
we currently find ourselves.”). 
118 For a review of the judiciary’s ability to check the other branches of government, see 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 1790 TO THE PRESENT  
(2007); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350 (2006); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); 
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In these ways, judicial review seeks to preserve democracy’s 
structural integrity as a system of governance and maintains balance of 
powers between branches of government. Independent courts help to defend 
existing rights and check autocratic impulses.   
However, courts sometimes are unable to restrain state power, 
particularly in times of emergency.119 David Cole, for example, identifies 
four reasons judicial review of national security may falter.120 First, judges, 
as government officials, are likely to identify with executive national security 
interests. When judges review national security cases, they are often highly 
deferential to executive policy decisions in their holdings.121 Second, the 
evaluation of national security, especially during crises and without access to 
classified information, is very difficult and tends to require judges to balance 
liberty interests and constitutional rights. In many instances, the mere 
mention of a national security claim may trigger a distinct set of deferential 
judicial dispositions. For example, “courts have declined to reach the merits of 
 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the Obama 
Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603 (2010). 
119  See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN 
THE BALANCE] (describing periods of court deference to the legislative branch in times of 
emergency); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND] (tracing the rise of the strong executive as characteristic of the modern era); 
Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J.  
422 (2012) (illustrating judicial capacity constraints impacting judicial deference toward 
political processes); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (illustrating the judiciary’s 
deferential approach in reviewing governmental actions and decisions during states of 
emergency); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in 
Wartime, WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003) (exploring judicial behavior during times of crisis, when 
security needs are sometimes overestimated at the expense of civil liberties). 
120 Cole, supra note 117, at 2570–71. 
121 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 135 (2007) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decisions post-9/11 and 
positing that “while the government’s losses in the Supreme Court made front-page news, 
the decisions were really little more than slaps on the wrist” because “[c]ontrary to the 
Court’s civil liberties rhetoric, it did not at that time require the President to alter many of 
his actions.”); Gross, supra note 119, at 1060–61 (recounting Chief Justice Chase’s view in 
Ex parte Milligan that the government’s “[p]owers expanded” and citizens’ “rights 
contracted . . . in times of crisis” and that deference to the government was simply “the price 
to be paid by society if it were to survive [a] crisis and retain its identity and independence”); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 
(2011) (illustrating the Supreme Court’s unwillingness “to engage the substance of 
counterterrorism policies”); Vladeck, supra note 118, at 608 (detailing the Supreme Court’s 
tacit agreement (by virtue of denying certiorari) with the Obama administration’s argument 
that the matters disputed in Kiyemba II were “best left to the discretion of the political 
branches in general, and to the Executive in particular”). 




almost all of the cases challenging executive policies on renditions, detainee 
treatment and transfers, legal targeting, and warrantless wiretapping.122 Third, 
judicial rulings against executives can create constitutional crises which 
threaten the legitimacy of the judiciary. Therefore, judicial decisions have 
tended to skirt substantive issues in favor of procedural critiques of legal 
decision-making.123 And finally, no judge wants to be responsible for the next 
attack. A judicial ruling limiting state action may result in serious costs to 
national security or human life. Judges will uphold executive orders and other 
policies more readily in light of these factors and deference becomes a 
mainstay of national security judicial review.124 
Debates on the scope of judicial review are longstanding.125 Under 
the right conditions, courts undeniably strengthen besieged constitutional 
democracies by protecting vulnerable groups against political repression.126 
But judicial review has limitations, particularly during times of crises. 127 
When politics and national security threats depart from ordinary judicial 
review, scholars have documented pronounced judicial deference to state 
authorities.128 Judicial deference may be appropriate at times. Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule, for example, have argued that in times of emergency the 
 
122 Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy 
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 829 (2013). 
123 Id. at 866, 896. 
124 See id. at 855 (“Where the executive generally receives a broad degree of deference, 
courts will be willing to uphold a wider range of executive policy choices.”). 
125 See generally Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986) (undergoing an examination of “court efforts to control agency 
action and the basic principles of law that govern judicial review of agency action”); 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling 
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2000) (providing a detailed explanation of “an overlooked tension between judicial 
deference to administrative agencies under modern administrative law and the judiciary’s 
original, influential role in our constitutional design”). 
126  Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1454 (2007) 
(“Independent judicial review takes on particular significance in parliamentary systems.  
There is an ever-present risk in democratic systems that the claimed exigencies necessitating 
the use of emergency powers, including the power to suppress antagonistic political speech, 
will become the rule that swallows the exception.”). 
127 POSNER & VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 119, at 33–34. 
128 Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1366–85 
(2009); Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 765, 776–86 (2016); see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 329 (1936) (“We deem it unnecessary to consider . . . the several clauses which are said 
to evidence the unconstitutionality of the Joint Resolution as involving an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power. It is enough to summarize by saying that, both upon principle 
and in accordance with precedent, we conclude there is sufficient warrant for the broad 
discretion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will 
have a beneficial effect upon the re-establishment of peace in the affected countries . . . .”).  
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executive's ability to act swiftly and decisively is both a normative good and 
a political inevitability.129 Other arguments in favor of judicial deference in 
national security cases involve claims to executive privilege, state secrecy, or 
judicial abstention from political questions.   
Legal black holes and legal grey holes pose yet other problems for 
judicial review. 130  Black holes are lawless voids carved out through 
legislation usually during states of emergency. In a legal black hole, law is 
totally suspended. Perhaps the most notorious example is the detention of 
enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where United States 
government officials held detainees in the war on terror and claimed to 
operate beyond any legal jurisdiction. Such legal voids permit authorities to 
operate without legal restriction. Along similar lines, legal grey holes are 
situations where legal restraints exist but judicial review remains too weak to 
stay state actions.131 Grey holes rely on judicial abdication or cursory judicial 
review to expand enforcement discretion where law would otherwise govern 
executive action.132 In both instances, robust judicial review may be required 
to reestablish substantive constitutional rights.133  
Judicial review also falters where judges refuse to scrutinize evidence 
of mismatch between state motivations and legal justifications. This problem 
was on display in Trump v. Hawaii.134 There, the United States Supreme 
Court applied only rational basis review to decide the legality of the Trump 
administration’s travel bans restricting immigration to the United States by 
 
129 POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 119, at 13–15. See generally 
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009) 
(arguing that administrative law inevitably includes legal black and grey holes). 
130 DYZENHAUS, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
131 Id. 
132 David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal 
Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2018 (2006) (“A grey hole is a legal space in which 
there are some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless void—but the 
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases.”). 
133 Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing 
Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV.  
1029, 1033 (2015) (“National security is becoming less an exceptional zone of limited or 
nonexistent legal protection and instead more like the domestic sphere where robust judicial 
review provides significant protections from government overreaching.”). 
134 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 (2018) (“Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be considered, but the 
policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: 
How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 641, 650 (2019) (“[C]onstitutional protections can be put on hold if the government 
asserts a remotely plausible claim of military necessity, and the ugly real motivations for a 
government policy can be swept under the rug.”). 




citizens of eight countries.135  The Court refused to evaluate whether the 
action arose from unconstitutional motives on the part of the administrative 
officials because of executive claims that the case involved national 
security. 136  Although all nine justices expressed misgivings about the 
administration’s purported policy rationales, a majority nonetheless deferred 
to the President and cast aside any constitutional considerations of well-
documented racial and religious animus. They upheld the travel bans because 
it was not impossible to find a relationship between the bans and legitimate 
state interests.137 Due to the administration’s national security claims, the 
Court’s majority doubled down on deference to executive power, even when 
the travel bans, if reviewed, might have been found to violate constitutional 
law. Justice Kennedy penned a concurrence in which he argued that “the very 
fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial 
scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to the 
Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.”138 Justice Kennedy, in his 
farewell opinion before leaving the Court, defended the promise of 
constitutional principles and at the same time refused to consider well-
founded allegations of unconstitutionality.139 Federal courts are not alone in 
showing such extreme deference in judicial review of national security.140 
Deference to considered professional judgments has long formed the 
backbone of national security review.141 Judges, who often lack bureaucratic 
support, resources, information, and experience in national security, are 
understandably reluctant to second-guess state authorities with greater access 
to real-time intelligence on security threats. But such deference often is 
premised on beliefs in well-reasoned and evidence-based decision-making.142 
 
135 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (deciding that, under rational basis review, the Court “will 
uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds”). 
136 Id. at 2421. 
137 Id. at 2402 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“On the few occasions 
where the Court has struck down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny, a 
common thread has been that the laws at issue were ‘divorced from any factual context from 
which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.’”).   
138 Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
139 See id. (arguing that “officials are [not] free to disregard the Constitution and the rights 
it proclaims and protects” even when their actions are not subject to judicial review). 
140 See, e.g., Heath, supra note 67, at 1066 (“[O]utside of a small set of patently abusive 
security measures, the new national security hinders the ability of tribunals to exercise 
meaningful review while also maintaining a high degree of deference.”) 
141 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (giving “great deference to 
the professional judgment of military authorities”); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quoting Goldman 475 U.S. at 507 for the same proposition). 
142 See Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 991, 995 (2018)(“In the Trump era, the President's open animus towards racial 
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Courts stand down to democratically elected state authorities, at least in part, 
because judges presume state leaders are seeking to make decisions in the 
public interest.143 Where these presumptions come into question, particularly 
in regimes flirting with autocratic rule, is when overly deferential courts 
effectively transform statutory vagueness in national security legislation into 
state power.144 
Bureaucratic norms, internal opposition from career civil servants, 
and administrative investigations also constrain autocratic power, even 
absent juridical review.145 However, courts are presumed to be sentinels of 
 
and religious minority groups and erratic decision-making will lead some judges, especially in 
the lower courts, to question executive national security claims more readily than in the past. 
Yet in cases where judges do not feel able to resolve disputes on the public record, concerns 
over the disclosure or management of national security information will persist.”). 
143 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008) (“Because our Nation’s past 
military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer 
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous 
threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury. This result is not 
inevitable, however. The political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to 
interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to 
preserve constitutional values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.”).   
144  Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1686–87 (2015) 
(stating that executives may rely upon [1] judicial review as a means of consolidating power; 
[2] defamation law to induce self-censorship; [3] electoral laws as a means of 
disenfranchisement; [4] non-political crimes against political opponents; [5] internationally-
backed institutions against dissidents; and [6] the abuse of democratic and rule-of-law 
rhetoric); David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 213 (2013) 
(“[C]onstitutional change can be used to either dismantle or pack institutions serving as 
strongholds for the opposition. The weakening or removal of opposition figures is 
instrumental to the construction of competitive authoritarian regimes because it gives 
incumbents a greatly increased power to rework the state to their advantage.”); Ginsburg, 
Huq & Versteeg, supra note 56, at 241 (“Across a range of different geopolitical contexts, 
an increasing number of countries can appropriately be characterized as ‘hybrid’ 
democracies, such as competitive authoritarian regimes and ‘democratorship[s].’”). 
145  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317–19 (2006) (arguing that 
bureaucracy is one important aspect of separation of powers); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting 
Rights from Within?: Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1027, 1029–30 (2013) (“[L]egal scholars also point to executive oversight institutions as 
necessary to mitigate inadequate judicial review of state national security activities. . . . 
Congress created [Inspectors General], which now exist in over fifty federal agencies, for the 
explicit purpose of monitoring agencies.”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: 
Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2007) (“This 
Article . . . seeks to elevate an essential source of constraint that often is underappreciated 
and underestimated: legal advisors within the executive branch.”); Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 677 (2005) 
(“The institutional literature typically projects confidence that the [Solicitor General] and 
[Office of Legal Counsel] . . . scrupulously protect the Constitution against executive officials 
distorting the law to advance personal, partisan, or institutionally parochial agendas.”). 




the rule of law in liberal democracies and serve as bulwarks to safeguard 
citizens’ rights and freedoms against state encroachment. Judges relinquish 
this role in national security cases in an effort to protect the public. 146 
However, in the present era, where national security legislation often 
decouples from evidence-based assessments of violence, judges should not 
always presume that democratically elected leaders will act in good faith or 
for the public good. Judicial officials have a greater responsibility for 
thorough judicial review, particularly in countries with legalistic autocrats. 
 
C. Legalistic Autocrats 
 
There has been a resurgence of autocratic leadership amid the current 
democratic recession.147 Many autocrats are using law as a means to legitimate 
their actions and authority. Legalistic autocrats have eroded democratic norms 
and cowed political opponents in a growing number of states.148   
This rise of legalistic autocrats who rely on national security laws to 
obscure unlawful practices reflects previous democratic gains. After the Cold 
War, ideas about human rights and democracy diffused around the globe.149 
The proliferation of liberal values raised costs for political leaders who openly 
engaged in direct forms of political repression. Bilateral and multilateral 
sanctions regimes, for example, began to monitor democratic progress and 
punish heads of state who exercised extra-legal authority.150 As a result, would-
be autocrats in weak democratic states had to search for more legitimate means 
to consolidate political authority.151  It became harder to suppress political 
opposition with outright reliance on brute force or state violence.152 
National security lawmaking emerged as a salient resource for 
autocrats seeking political cover. According to Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, 
“hybrid regimes” have become more common in recent decades. 153 
 
146 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (providing that 
“respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate” because “national security and 
foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an 
area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult 
to assess.”). 
147 Diamond, supra note 47, at 151–52. 
148 Attila Ágh, for example, has traced Hungary’s democratic backsliding in recent decades.  
Attila Ágh, Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: The Last Decade as the Lost 
Decade in Democratization, 7 J. COMP. POL. 4 (2014). 
149 John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society 
and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 144, 174 (1997). 
150 David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
1069, 1093 (2016). 
151 Scheppele, supra note 15, 188–233. 
152  Kim Lane Scheppele, Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the 
“Frankenstate,” EUR. POL. & SOC’Y (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Winter 2013, at 5–7. 
153 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 94–95. 
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Democratic declines, they argue, have followed two distinct paths: 
authoritarian reversion and constitutional retrogression.154 Huq and Ginsburg 
predict that the likelihood of authoritarian reversion—the near total collapse of 
democratic institutions and norms—presents less of a threat to democracies 
than the risk of constitutional retrogression—the incremental erosion of fair 
elections, political speech, and law.155 If this is correct, national security law 
presents opportunities for legalistic autocrats to legitimate undemocratic state 
power and expand state enforcement authority.156   
This deepening global crisis of governance increases the danger that 
heads of state will misuse national security law. Increased enforcement of 
counterterrorism laws worldwide illustrates this risk and its relationship with 
democracy. In less than a decade, law enforcement agencies arrested nearly 
120,000 individuals for terrorism-related offenses worldwide.157 Nearly one 
out of three of these arrests resulted in a conviction, more than 35,000 
worldwide. 158  However, counterterrorism enforcement was remarkably 
















154 Id. at 92. 
155 Id. at 168. 
156 See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.  
SCI. 281, 283 (2014) (“Law and courts are frequently deployed to (a) exercise state power 
vis-à-vis opposition, (b) advance administrative discipline within state institutions, (c) 
maintain cohesion among various factions within the ruling coalition, (d) facilitate market 
transitions, (e) contain majoritarian institutions through authoritarian enclaves, (f) delegate 
controversial reforms, and (g) bolster regime legitimacy.”). 
157 Martha Mendoza, Christopher Torchia, Christopher Bodeen, Paul Schemm & Ciaran 
Giles, AP Analysis: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted as Terrorists Since 9/11, MERCURY NEWS 
(Aug. 13, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2011/09/05/ap-analysis-35000-
worldwide-convicted-as-terrorists-since-911/ [https://perma.cc/JAR2-DGPL].  
158 Id.   
159 Id. 





Graph 1: Cumulative Arrests and Convictions Under Counterterrorism 




Data collected by Associated Press (AP) in 2011 shows that 
counterterrorism arrests and convictions increased in the decade after 9/11.160 
However, annual fluctuations suggest an irregular pattern of counterterrorism 
practice worldwide. During 2001–2003, the number of arrests hovered 
between 2,500 and 3,000 arrests per year worldwide. This figure more than 
doubled in 2004, to over 6,000 arrests. After a slight decline in 2005, the 
numbers climb again to more than 7,300 arrests in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, 
there is another increase to over 11,000 and 17,000 arrests, respectively. The 
trend continues into 2009, when countries in the sample reported more than 









160 Id. The Associated Press team coordinated freedom-of-information act requests in 105 
countries with freedom-of-information laws and obtained data for 64 countries. Id. For 
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Three countries—Nepal, Pakistan, and Turkey—reported more than 
85,000 arrests. Eight additional countries reported more than 1,000 arrests 
during this same period and eight more reported between 100 and 1,000 
arrests. The remaining states reported fewer than 100 arrests on terrorism-
related charges. Notably, more than a quarter of the countries did not report 
a single arrest. 161  Pervasive statutory vagueness in counterterrorism law 
provided opportunities for abuse to many state leaders, but data shows 
enforcement agencies in a select group of weak democratic or autocratic 
countries were disproportionately responsible for the vast number of arrests 


























Table 2: Cumulative Number of Counterterrorism Arrests and 
Convictions by Country, 2001–2010, (AP) 
 
Country Arrests  Country Convictions 
Turkey 37242  Turkey 12897 
Pakistan 29050 **China  7776 
Nepal 18934 Bangladesh 3466 
Israel 7971 *Pakistan 2905 
**China  7649 United States 2568 
Bangladesh 3466 Tunisia 1123 
United States 2934 Peru 864 
Ireland 2264 Spain 839 
Morocco 2000 Indonesia 684 
France 1687 Italy 460 
Spain 1594 Ireland 357 
Indonesia 765 India 209 
United Kingdom 660 France 187 
Italy 632 Azerbaijan 175 
Colombia 493 United Kingdom 126 
India 485 Thailand 56 
Azerbaijan 199 Germany 52 
Macedonia 175 Belgium 39 
Chile 108 Montenegro 35 
Mexico 86 Netherlands 35 
Germany 77 Mexico 29 
Uganda 75 Ukraine 27 
Belgium 70 Australia 26 
Netherlands 67 Denmark 25 
Montenegro 45 Macedonia 19 
Australia 35 South Africa 18 
Portugal 35 Hungary 14 
Denmark 27 Canada 13 
Georgia 23 Greece 13 
Greece 23 Serbia 12 
Kyrgyzstan 23 Chile 10 
Austria 22 Uganda 10 
Romania 19 Costa Rica 9 
Hungary 17 Sweden 9 
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New Zealand 17 Lithuania 8 
Serbia 14 Georgia 7 
Guatemala 13 Portugal 7 
Norway 13 Finland 3 
Sweden 12 Austria 2 
Slovakia 7 Argentina 1 
Bulgaria 5 Croatia 1 
Cyprus 3 Guatemala 1 
Poland 3 Afghanistan 0 
Slovenia 3 Albania 0 
Argentina 1 Algeria 0 
Lithuania 1 Andorra 0 
Armenia 0 Angola 0 
* The number of convictions for Pakistan was calculated based on a reported 
ten percent conviction rate for the total number of individuals arrested.   
** The reported number of arrests in China is lower than the reported number 
of convictions in China, which suggests some error or misrepresentation in 
the data. 
 
Further, more than half of all convictions for terrorism-related 
offenses occurred in just two countries, Turkey and China. The top six 
enforcement regimes also account for nearly ninety percent of the total 
number of convictions.162 To put that in perspective, the total number of 
convictions in Turkey and China was more than four times the combined 
number of counterterrorism convictions in all reporting countries ranked 
below sixth.163 These stark differences illustrate how autocrats increasingly 
rely on national security laws. 
Disparities in the number of arrests and convictions also suggest the 
importance of country-level factors in the enforcement of national security 
law. Relationships between lawmaking, courts, and politics matter a great 
deal to whether regimes use national security law to investigate, detain, and 
punish suspects. Statistical correlations between enforcement data and 
various country-level indicators underscore significant relationships between 
national security laws, judicial review, and politics. 
For example, country-level data suggests that democratic norms and 
institutions lessen national security enforcement. Statistical regression 
models show relationships between counterterrorism practices and other 
country-level measures of terrorism, democracy, development, rule of law, 
 
162 Six countries account for 30,735 of the 35,117 reported convictions worldwide.   
163  There were 4,382 convictions under counterterrorism laws excluding the top six 
countries.  Turkey and China accounted for 20,673 convictions.   




and organizational associations.164 Controlling for region and population, the 
model below reveals a significant statistical relationship between 
counterterrorism arrests and two variables: 1) the number of fatal incidents of 
terrorism and 2) the level of democracy.165 The correlation between arrests and 
previous fatal attacks in a country suggests that while counterterrorism 
lawmaking has decoupled from evidence-based assessments of political 
violence in many countries, terrorism continues to impact domestic 
counterterrorism enforcement. Not surprisingly, countries with more incidents 
of terrorism arrest more people on terrorism-related offenses than countries 
with fewer terrorist attacks. However, the model finds no correlation between 
fatal acts of terrorism and terrorism convictions. The use of administrative 
detention to hold suspects without charges or otherwise deny suspects judicial 


























164 For a detailed description of the independent variables, see infra, methods app. A. The 
country-level variables were compiled from a number of well-known sources, including the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Union of 
International Associations (UIA), the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD). 
165 The threshold for statistical significance is a p-value below .05. 
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Table 3: Regression of Counterterrorism Arrests and Convictions, 2001–
2010, (AP Data). 
 
VARIABLES Arrests Convictions 








































Observations 46 41 
R-squared 0.333 0.326 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Democratic states are also significantly less likely to arrest and 
convict suspects, even after controlling for region, population, level of 
development, rule of law, and associational ties to global society. 
Counterterrorism enforcement decreases as measures of democracy increase. 
Controlling again for region and population, the regression model probes the 
statistical relationships between democracy and counterterrorism arrests and 
convictions using the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, 
which comprises data on five spheres of state activity: civil liberties, electoral 











Table 4: OLS Regression of Anti-terrorism Arrests and Convictions, 
2001–2010 (AP). 
 
VARIABLES Arrests Convictions 




















































Observations 46 41 
R-squared 0.555 0.710 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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The model shows that a country’s rating on the Civil Liberty Index (CLI) 
correlates with state officials’ propensity to enforce counterterrorism laws.166 
Authorities in less democratic states appear more likely to enforce 
counterterrorism laws even after controlling for histories of violence. The 
result underscores the politics at play in national security enforcement. The 
Democratic Political Culture Index and the Electoral Process and Pluralism 
Index also correlate with terrorism convictions, lending support to the idea 
that societies with more autocratic leadership or limited electoral 
participation are more likely to adopt aggressive counterterrorism 
enforcement practices.   
The statistical models provide evidence of greater national security 
enforcement in less democratic regimes and suggest national security laws 
cloak repressive tactics in more autocratic states. National studies of 
counterterrorism enforcement lend support to this conclusion.167 Legalistic 
autocrats appear to exploit vague national security laws, particularly in 
countries with weak democratic norms and institutions, to expand state 
policing and consolidate their authority.   
 
CONCLUSION 
   
Relying on new empirical data, this Article advances a relational 
approach to the study of national security lawmaking and develops the 
concept of dark law. Dark law describes the convergence of statutory 
vagueness, judicial deference, and autocratic politics. It is a relational process 
in which legalistic autocrats use vague national security law to sidestep 
restraints on their power. In recent decades, policymakers worldwide have 
enacted vague national security statutes. National security lawmaking in 
some countries has also decoupled from considerations of violence and 
reasoned assessments of security threats. Meanwhile, judicial authorities 
customarily defer to legalistic autocrats’ interpretations of national security 
provisions. Dark law emerges from this coalescence of autocratic politics, 
statutory vagueness, and judicial deference. It represents a shadowy threat to 
democracy by making it difficult for the public to see autocratic maneuvers 
that consolidate their hold on state power.168 
 
166 The Civil Liberty Index assigns countries a rating based on independent survey and World 
Value Survey data intended to evaluate the existence of a free press, an independent 
judiciary, voluntary associations, religious tolerance, equality under the law, basic security 
of persons and property, and the use of torture by the state. 
167  See generally ANDREW NEAL, EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM: LIBERTY, SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2009) (describing the 
justification of the use of illiberal practices in the name of post-9/11 national security). 
168 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Democracies die 
behind closed doors.”) 




 Dark law is most common in weak democratic states, though it may 
also be used by state leaders in hybrid or authoritarian regimes. Strong 
democratic institutions and robust judicial review make a state less vulnerable 
to dark law. However, courts harbor the power to help stabilize democratic 
institutions only if they are willing to exercise it. Regrettably, in the absence 
of democratic and judicial counterweights, legalistic autocrats use law to 
maintain social control and to enhance regime legitimacy.169 Legal observers 
should be aware of the threat posed by legalistic autocrats and stand against 
efforts to use national security laws to escape judicial oversight and 
democratic accountability. Otherwise, legalistic autocrats can selectively 
investigate, detain, prosecute, and imprison disfavored groups under the guise 




Relational legal analysis typically requires empirical investigation. 
However, national security agencies are not known for transparency. Valuable 
data may be classified, redacted, or destroyed by security officials. Legal 
provisions are frequently amended or revised and finding reliable translations 
can prove difficult. These environmental and linguistic challenges create a near 
perfect storm to navigate as an empirical legal scholar. This research sought to 
overcome these obstacles by triangulating national security data from different 
sources. Specifically, the data derives from four datasets: 1) an archive of 
national counterterrorism laws at Human Rights Watch; 2) content coding of 
national counterterrorism laws; 3) counterterrorism enforcement data on 
arrests and convictions under counterterrorism laws from 2001 to 2010; and 4) 
country-level indicators compiled from the Global Terrorism Database, the 
World Bank, the United Nations, Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Union 
of International Organizations. The data focuses on counterterrorism laws as 
an uncontroversial subset of national security law with well-documented 
implications for state power.   
 
A. Archival Data 
 
The data collection includes an archive of counterterrorism laws 
worldwide, compiled in collaboration with attorneys at the Program on 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Human Rights Watch (HRW). 170 This 
 
169  Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in 
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 21 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008). 
170 In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide Since September 11, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/29/name-
security/counterterrorism-laws-worldwide-september-11 [https://perma.cc/CNW2-7PFX]. 
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data included 193 UN-recognized countries. For each country, the author 
reviewed all documents in the country file at HRW and cross-referenced 
these documents with legislation, documents, reports, or other texts obtained 
from six independent data sources:  
1. The United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) legislation 
database;  
2. The Legislationline Database;  
3. The Interpol Terrorism Database;  
4. The CODEXTER country profiles;  
5. The Foreign Law Guide Database; and  
6. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) 
country reports.   
 
The completed archive undercounts the total number of laws 
worldwide. Many states do not report immigration and financial statutes 
bearing on counterterrorism practices to the UN CTC or make them available 
in legislative databases.   
 
B. Content Coding 
 
In order to assess the substantive content of the counterterrorism laws, 
the author coded the texts of the archived counterterrorism laws with a focus 
on seven categories. Countries were the primary unit of analysis for the 
content coding. 
1. Definitions of terrorism; 
2. Definitions of terrorist organizations; 
3. Prohibitions on material support for terrorism; 
4. Limitations on speech that incites, legitimates, or lends support to 
terrorism; 
5. Expanded police powers; 
6. Procedures for administrative detention; 
7. The imposition of heightened penalties for terrorism-related offenses. 
 
For each category, the author created a series of dichotomous 
variables to provide accurate counts of the substantive features of the laws 
and allow for statistical analysis. When the archive contained multiple laws 
for a single country, the author used the most recent counterterrorism statute 
or legal code for the content analysis. If the most recent statute or legal code 
did not contain any information on a given variable, the author reviewed the 
previous statute or legal code and used those standards in the coding with the 
assumption that the previous legal standard would be applied in practice. If 
no previous legal standard existed, the variable was left blank. The content 
coding represents cross-sectional data for the year 2009. All regression 




models reflect this 2009 coding of state counterterrorism laws worldwide.   
Dichotomous variables measured the presence or the absence of 
legislative activity with regard to terrorism before and after the 9/11 attacks. 
The first variable indicated whether a state enacted any counterterrorism laws 
before 9/11. The second variable indicated whether a state enacted any 
counterterrorism laws after 9/11. Drawing on documents from the 
counterterrorism archive, the author coded variables based on reforms to 
criminal codes or the enactment of terrorism statutes. The UN Committee on 
Counter-Terrorism encouraged all states to report any counterterrorism 
actions in country reports. The variables, therefore, captured most 
counterterrorism laws enacted worldwide, particularly in the post-9/11 
period. To assess lawmaking activity, the author also built ordinal variables 
to capture the number of counterterrorism measures enacted before 9/11 and 
after 9/11. If documents from the counterterrorism archive showed that a 
country enacted two new counterterrorism laws before 9/11, the pre-9/11 
ordinal variable would be coded “2.” Likewise, if a country reported three 
new counterterrorism laws after 9/11, the corresponding variable would be 
coded “3.” These ordinal variables were broad measures of counterterrorism 
activity before 9/11 and after 9/11.   
Translation problems sometimes complicated coding. UN CTC 
reports provided English translations which proved useful for substantive 
coding of post-9/11 laws. 171 The reports, however, rarely provided 
translations of previous laws that had been amended, repealed, or 
substantially reformed. The difficulty of finding translations of previous laws 
prevented the construction of a longitudinal dataset. 
Counterterrorism laws changed constantly during data collection and 
analysis. Some of the laws used in the analysis have since been amended or 
invalidated. The data, therefore, should not be used as a current rendering of 
counterterrorism law. The work sacrifices some national precision in order to 
capture global shifts in counterterrorism lawmaking.   
 
C. Arrests and Convictions Data 
 
Gathering reliable data on counterterrorism enforcement is even more 
challenging than gathering translations of national laws, particularly in 
countries where information on criminal detentions and prosecutions is not 
public. For the analysis, the author relied on data collected by a team of 140 
Associated Press (AP) journalists in 2011. The journalists collected 
information on counterterrorism arrests and convictions in sixty-four 
countries between 2001 and 2011. The AP team requested data on 
 
171 The UN CTC country reports were not available before October of 2001, when the United 
Nations created the Counter-Terrorism Committee.   
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counterterrorism enforcement in 105 countries with freedom-of-information 
laws. Journalists working in-country and generally fluent in the national 
language vetted the data. Collectively, the AP obtained arrest and conviction 
numbers from 2001–2011. Although reporting countries represented a 
minority of states worldwide, these countries included more than three-
quarters of the global population. 
 
D. Country-Level Data 
 
The author merged the content coding with country level indicators 
from a number of sources, including the Global Terrorism Database, the 
World Bank, the United Nations, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the 
Union of International Organizations. Below is a brief description of these 
country-level variables.   
 
1. Dependent variables 
 
Counterterrorism Content Codes: Substantive features of the laws 
were coded as dichotomous variables. These variables were organized around 
seven substantive categories. 
Counterterrorism Measures Before 9/11: A dichotomous variable and 
an ordinal variable captured the number of counterterrorism measures enacted 
in each country prior to 9/11. In some models, these were control variables. 
Counterterrorism Measures After 9/11: A dichotomous variable and an 
ordinal variable captured the number of counterterrorism measures enacted in 
each country after to 9/11. In some models, these were control variables. 
 
2. Independent variables 
 
History of Terrorism: Data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) was used as a measure for history of terrorism. GTD included 
information on more than 82,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks 
between 1970 and 2007.172 The GTD database identified terrorism incidents 
from wire services, foreign broadcast services, U.S. State Department reports, 
US and foreign newspaper reports, and information generated by staff. GTD 
defined terrorism as events involving “the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal 
through fear, coercion or intimidation.”173 Because the author used cross-
 
172 See Global Terrorism Database, supra note 81.  
173 See GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, CODEBOOK: INCLUSION CRITERIA AND VARIABLES 
10 (2019), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GLG6-7KXW]. 




sectional data on the content of the laws, the author collapsed the years of the 
GTD database, creating a cumulative count for each individual country across 
the years 1970–2010. This count acted as an estimate of the domestic impact 
of terrorism in a country. For the purposes of this general measure, all terrorist 
incidents in the GTD were treated as equivalent events. For example, three 
independent bombings of an oil pipeline in Sudan that caused no fatalities 
would be counted the same as three car bombings in Iraq resulting in two dozen 
fatalities. To account for differences in the character of terrorism events, the 
author also created independent measures for terrorist incidents which caused 
more than one casualty and for terrorist incidents which caused more than 
fifteen casualties. The author used these measures of fatal terrorist incidents as 
a means to adjust for the increased rhetorical use of terrorism after 9/11. 
Economic Development: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
and the Human Development Index were used as measures of development. 
The author reported GDP from 2009 in constant 2005 dollars. The author also 
used the 2009 Human Development Index rating for each country.174 The two 
separate measures yielded similar results in regression models. 
Rule of Law: The author included the World Bank Rule of Law 
Estimate (2009) as a way to capture public confidence in rule of law. The 
variable accounted for the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
policing, and access to the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. The rule of law estimate was included in statistical models as a 
control measure.   
Population: The author included the Human Development Reports 
Population total for both sexes (thousands) (2009) as a control variable. 
Education: The author included the Human Development Reports 
Education Index (2009) as a control variable. 
Gender: The author included the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
as a control variable. 
Democracy: The author measured democracy using the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (2008). The index measures the 
current state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states based on 
five categories: 1) electoral process and pluralism; 2) civil liberties; 3) the 
functioning of government; 4) political participation; and 5) political culture. 
The index also categorizes countries within one of four types of regimes: 1) 
full democracies; 2) flawed democracies; 3) hybrid regimes; and 4) 




174 For more detailed technical information about the indicators, consult the websites of the 
respective source agencies at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics [https://perma.cc/EQF6-
DQSM]. 
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author also broke down the index and used the measures of the individual 
categories to provide a more nuanced analysis of the features of a society that 
correlated with greater counterterrorism enforcement.  
Influence of the World Polity: The author measured the influence of 
the world polity on a given country by the number of INGOs and NGOs in a 
state. Data from the Union of International Associations (2007) was used to 
measure the number of organizations. 
The triangulation of data from various sources and the documentation 
of statutory vagueness, judicial review, and enforcement of laws by legalistic 
autocrats provide insight into the relations, transactions, and processes that 
shape national security in weak democracies. The data also document global 
transformations of national security lawmaking. 
 
 
 
